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ABSTRACT
In April 2007, New York City's Mayor Bloomberg released PlaNYC, a broad
ranging set of planning initiatives for the city. A centerpiece of the plan was a
congestion-pricing proposal for the downtown core in Manhattan. The proposal had the
backing of key political figures, federal funding, and broad popular support, yet in failed
to clear the state assembly without even getting a vote. The failure of Bloomberg's
proposal is instructive not only to New York and other cities considering congestion
pricing, but also to proponents of a broad range of sustainability initiatives. This thesis
argues that specific aspects of the mayor's proposal created easily identifiable
opponents unified on geographic lines, specifically in the outer boroughs of New York
City. Further, the planning process failed to appease enough of these opponents or
build a winning coalition to enact the policy. New York City is a challenging institutional
environment, and in this setting, coalition building becomes even more important.
Thesis supervisor: Judith Layzer, Professor of Environmental Policy
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On Earth Day in 2007, New York City's Mayor Bloomberg announced PlaNYC, a
set of sustainability initiatives that aimed to "Create a Greener, Greater, New York City"
(City of New York 2007b). Transportation was one area of focus of the plan, and the
centerpiece of the mayor's transportation proposal was a relatively simple form
congestion pricing in Manhattan called a cordon toll. The plan sought to establish a
cordon around the lower half of the island and charge drivers $8 for entering that zone
between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on weekdays. London has had considerable success with a
similar approach beginning in 2003.
By March 2008, Bloomberg's proposal appeared to have momentum. Although it
engendered a great deal of controversy among residents in and around the city, polls
showed that two thirds of New Yorkers supported the toll (Quinnipiac University 2008).
The proposal had strong support among prominent politicians as well, including the
Governor of New York and the state senate majority leader, and preliminary approval of
a $354 million federal grant to help with implementation. To secure those funds, the
state legislature had to approve the toll by April 7, 2008. In March of 2008, the city
council voted 30-20 in favor of the toll, so the only remaining roadblock was approval
from the state. The New York State Assembly considered the issue but allowed the
federal deadline to pass without bringing the proposal up for a floor vote, effectively
killing it.
Why did Mayor Bloomberg's congestion-pricing plan for New York City fail in
spite of the backing of key political figures, dedicated advocates, and strong popular
support? I argue there were two reasons, neither of which on its own would have been
sufficient to obstruct the proposal, but in combination they were lethal. First, the specific
proposal created opponents who were sufficiently unified and sympathetic to sway
uncommitted politicians in the state assembly. Although many observers focus on the
division between drivers and non-drivers, the more important distinctions in New York
City were based on location and income-and in particular the tension between affluent
Manhattan and the poorer outer boroughs: the structure of the cordon toll created a set
of "losers" who opposed the proposal. Second, the political and planning process failed
to address the interests of the primary opponents or build trust between the planners
and skeptics. This happened even though the legislature gave the planners an
excellent opportunity to communicate with their critics through the Traffic Congestion
Mitigation Commission (TCMC).
There were other factors that dimmed the proposal's chances as well: the entire
debate played out in an institutional context that gives skeptics many opportunities to
undermine efforts to challenge the status quo. The proposal had to win the approval of
three legislative bodies, three executives, and the U.S. Department of Transportation.
These institutions represent a wide range of interests, and the need to appease so
many disparate parties made finding compromise more difficult and reduced flexibility to
make changes later in the process. By contrast, the political structure in London is
considerably simpler. What's more, Bloomberg may have been personally less inclined
towards building a winning coalition than Livingstone.
Understanding why New York rejected congestion pricing sheds light on any
attempts to implement progressive reform to increase sustainability in our society. At its
core, congestion pricing targets a necessary behavioral change. People may disagree
about the method, but the change is needed. Although the primary motivation for
implementing congestion pricing is not environmental improvement, it helps get cars off
the streets and improves conditions for pedestrians and mass transit. Perhaps more
important, it provides a revenue source that can be directed toward mass transit. The
mayor and his supporters saw congestion pricing as a tool to improve sustainability,
economic efficiency, and quality of life in New York City. In today's tougher economic
environment, the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) is grappling with
severe budget problems, so congestion pricing may reappear on the agenda in the city.
Understanding the primary causes for congestion pricing's failure in New York City will
inform future attempts to implement congestion pricing and other aggressive policies
designed to build more sustainable cities.
Addressing Congestion in Cities
Driving is a major contributor to many environmental problems. Its direct impacts
include local air and noise pollution and greenhouse-gas emissions, and its indirect
effects include increased land and resource use. Traffic congestion is particularly
damaging: cars stuck in traffic emit more pollution; perhaps more important, the
standard solution to congestion is to build more roads, thereby increasing land use and
dependence on the automobile. Beyond environmental issues, congested roads lead to
an inefficient allocation of road space, since they waste drivers' time, decrease mobility,
and have lower capacity than clear roads.
Congestion pricing involves using road pricing or tolls to discourage drivers from
using congested routes at popular times. The simplest incarnation would be a constant
toll that targets an overused bridge. At the other end of the spectrum, some advocates
envision dynamic systems that produce up-to-the-minute prices for every road in an
area. The defining feature is that prices are used to maintain congestion at some
"optimal" level rather than discouraging driving in general or repaying construction
debts. There are tradeoffs between accurate traffic management and implementation
costs, but generally congestion prices vary by day and time. Singapore, London and
New York all settled on a system called a cordon toll that charges a fixed fee for driving
into a cordon around the central business district. Under such an approach, a vehicle is
charged only once per day and only during daytime hours.
Congestion pricing has gained popularity due to the challenges of managing
congestion solely through transit planning. Traditionally, cities have sought to engineer
their way out of the problem, first by improving conditions for traffic flow, but ultimately
by building more roads. New construction is expensive, and in many places space for
new roads is extremely limited. Although construction may be a preferred option in
many places, it tends to encourage sprawl and only solves the congestion problem
temporarily (Mieszkowski and Mills 1993; Baum-Snow 2007). New roads quickly fill up
with mores cars as people adjust their travel patterns and additional development in turn
adds users to the road. Construction is only a temporary fix since traffic conditions
worsen over time. Further, in dense cities such as New York, the space and cost
constraints make construction a poor alternative.
Since the traditional approach of meeting demand with construction is
problematic, the main alternative is to explore systems of rationing. Congestion pricing
is one such system, using price as the instrument for rationing road space. Engineering
solutions also exist in some places for rationing. For instance, cars can be held at
entrances ramps to the highway to keep the highway flowing at optimal capacity.
Access to one road is allocated by queuing prior to entry. In theory, solutions like that
could be implemented more generally, and priority could be given to buses and other
trips. Current implementations are space intensive, so they are not practical for a dense
city such as New York. Also, queuing fails to prevent the time wasted in congestion,
though it's possible that technology could alleviate this problem: computer-controlled
systems could allocate road space in advance of trips.
Another rationing solution that has been tried in a number of cities worldwide is
restricting access to roads based on license plate number. For instance, Mexico City
instituted a program in 1989 that banned most users from driving their automobile one
weekday per week based on the last digit of the license plate (Davis 2008).
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky (D, Westchester) proposed a similar system as an
alternative to congestion pricing in New York City (Neuman 2008a). One problem that
Mexico City had with this system is that it led to a spike in used car sales, as wealthier
people purchased a second car that they could use on alternate days. Second cars
tended to be cheaper and dirtier, and greatly reduced the effectiveness of the system
(Davis 2008).
The most common alternative to expanding existing roadways is to endure the
congestion. Road demand is naturally limited by capacity, but drivers have to endure
substantial waits in order to use the road. The resulting delays are problematic for
several reasons. First, road capacity tends to decline in congested conditions, so fewer
users can use the road. Second, congested roads are unable to distinguish between
users with different value for the road. For example, an emergency vehicle and city bus
both have a very high value for their trip compared to a passenger car. The emergency
vehicle needs to deliver someone to the hospital quickly, and the trip cannot easily be
replaced by transit. The bus trip has a high value based on the number of users. Cities
often make efforts to accommodate these high value trips in congested areas by giving
the vehicles sirens or dedicated bus lanes, but these solutions are only half-measures
compared with keeping roads free of congestion (Dahlgren 1998).
Congestion pricing is an elegant theoretical solution to a pervasive problem.
Cities facing similar congestion problems will increasingly want to consider whether
some system of pricing is a better way to allocate road space than building new roads
or tolerating congestion.
Rationale for Congestion Pricing
The rationale for congestion pricing is rooted in an externality argument. Drivers
impose costs on other drivers and on society as a whole. Without charging drivers for
those costs, roads are overused, causing congestion and other social costs. Drivers
pay other fees, including traditional tolls and gasoline taxes. Tolls are often used to
recoup the construction costs of building a bridge, tunnel, or highway. Although they
may result in reduced road use, they have been instituted primarily to raise revenue,
rather than manage traffic. Gasoline taxes are also used to fund maintenance costs or
potentially charge for general environmental damage from driving. What sets apart
congestion charges is the focus on the specific costs associated with congestion rather
than road wear and tear or environmental damage. During rush hour in crowded urban
areas, such costs may be orders of magnitude larger than other external costs of driving
(Komanoff 2010; Evans 1992).
Congestion pricing is a potentially effective way to address environmental
problems and improve mobility while providing a significant revenue source for state or
local government. There is a longstanding theoretical literature advocating congestion
pricing as a way to address congestion (Gomez-Ibanez 1992). According to its
proponents, the charge is used to internalize the cost a driver's actions impose on other
drivers in the form of decreased travel speeds. More recently, proponents have touted
congestion pricing as a way to enhance environmental outcomes by reducing
congestion, reducing driving overall, and improving surface mass transit. Although
theory suggests that it can be a powerful tool for enhancing urban sustainability,
congestion pricing has been politically unpopular and has been implemented in only a
few cities worldwide. As a result, proponents need to build supportive coalitions behind
congestion pricing rather than rely solely on the technical merits of the proposal.
Proponents can present congestion pricing in two different ways. First,
congestion pricing is a market-based mechanism for addressing congestion that is
primarily targeted at improving road conditions and incidentally generates revenue.
Second, congestion pricing is a way to generate revenue that happens to improve
economic efficiency by reducing congestion. The political motivation can come from
either the congestion reduction or the revenue generation and although both are
certainly important in any discussion, the primary goal can drive the policy design and
political discussion.
Congestion pricing is politically controversial because it creates clearly
identifiable winners and losers. Drivers in aggregate are typically worse off as a result
of a congestion pricing system unless the revenues are returned to them through road
improvements or some kind of targeted tax rebate (Evans 1992). In fact, the transfers
between drivers and non-drivers may end up being larger than the social benefits
associated with the congestion reduction in the scheme. If the congestion-pricing
scheme is focused on revenue for transit, then most drivers are likely to oppose the
plan. If the scheme is focused on reducing congestion, it is only effective to the extent it
gets drivers to stop driving, so these drivers will tend to oppose the proposed charge.
Of the drivers that continue to use the road, some are better off if their value of time
saved exceeds the tolls, and those with a lower value of time are worse off. Even if the
scheme is focused on congestion reduction it has the opportunity to mitigate some of
these negative impacts on individuals by spending revenue on new roads, bike lanes,
pedestrian routes, or improved transit service.
Congestion Pricing Around the World
Singapore was the first city to adopt congestion pricing in 1975. The city-state of
approximately four million people began to consider the pricing scheme in the 1970s, as
many residents were becoming affluent enough to afford an automobile (Gomez-Ibanez
1994). Congestion was a growing problem in Singapore, and the dense island city had
limited options for road expansion. The government imposed a fee of 3 Singapore
dollars (around US$1.42) for driving into the 2.4-square-mile downtown area between
7:30 a.m. and 10:15 a.m. Monday through Saturday (Gomez-Ibanez 1994). Taxis were
initially granted an exemption, but this was later revoked. The operating hours were
soon expanded to run from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Monday through Friday and 7:30 a.m.
until 2:00 p.m. Saturday (Richards 2006).
Singapore initially relied on paper licenses to control entry into the downtown
area. Drivers would purchase a license ahead of time and display it on their dashboard.
The licenses were color coded for the month and numbered by day so enforcement
officers could easily check whether a car was displaying the correct pass. The 33 entry
points were marked with gantries that flashed when enforcement was in effect.
Although it was an ingenious system at the time, paper licenses limited officials' ability
to vary charges by place or time, and downtown Singapore suffered from spillover traffic
into the surrounding area (Gomez-lbanez 1994).
In 1998, the city adopted an electric tolling system using stored-value cards and
an in-vehicle reader. Once the new system was established, the city began to vary tolls
by time of day and traffic level. Currently the system uses computers and real-time
sensors to predict traffic flow an hour in advance and set tolls accordingly to manage
traffic flow (Belson 2008). Current tolls are displayed to motorists on lighted signs as
they approach the toll-restricted area.
Singapore's experience illustrates the potential effectiveness of a congestion
pricing. Government officials were able to use congestion pricing to control congestion
and improve livability in the downtown area. Still, its experience tells us little about the
political viability of congestion pricing. The city had low levels of auto ownership when
the scheme was introduced, which limits the comparability with most cities in the
developed world today. Perhaps more important, Singapore's longstanding system of
single-party rule shielded the government from political pressure and allowed officials to
implement a radical policy change that may have been unpopular in places with a more
democratic political system (Gomez-Ibanez 2010). After Singapore instituted its
congestion charge, a few European cities subsequently adopted systems with similar
features. Several Norwegian cities use toll rings dating back to the 1980s, but the tolls
are fairly low and the revenue is designated for repaying construction costs. The rings
were not geared explicitly towards congestion control, so they were relatively ineffective
(Gomez-Ibanez 2005). Rome has an access-control system where non-residents have
to pay to enter the historic city center, but the tolls do not vary by time of day (Richards
2006).
The first European city to consider a congestion charging system similar in scope
to Singapore was London. London had studied congestion pricing dating back to the
1960s, and in the late 1990s, a working group was established to study the issue in
detail and prepare the technical aspects of congestion pricing for the city (Gomez-
Ibanez 2005). London was in a period of transition politically at the time. In 1986,
Margaret Thatcher had dissolved the metropolitan government known as the Greater
London Council and given authority to the 33 borough governments. In 1997, when
Tony Blair took over as Prime Minister, the Labour Party worked to reestablish the
metropolitan government to deal with transit issues. The London Authority Act of 1999
created the position of Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority. The
Authority's transit mandate was to manage London's roadways and transit services and
levy road charges and parking taxes. Transport for London (TfL) was created as a state
agency directly responsible for managing transportation issues (Greater London
Authority 2010).
Ken Livingstone had served in the Greater London Council and earned the
nickname of "Red Ken" for his left-wing politics. In the interim he served as a member
of parliament for the Labour party, and when the Greater London Authority was created,
he decided to run in the inaugural mayoral election in 2000. Livingstone lost the Labour
nomination in part because leaders of the party were afraid he would alter the party's
moderate image (Gomez-Ibanez 2005). Livingstone decided to run as an independent,
and made congestion pricing one of his central campaign promises. He calculated that
more Londoners would vote for him based on the promise to reduce congestion than
would vote against him as a result of the charge (Lee 2008). The other two major
candidates both ran against congestion charges (Richards 2006). Livingstone won with
58 percent of the final vote.
After the election, the road was clear for Livingstone to implement congestion
pricing: he had a popular mandate for the proposal based on his mayoral victory; he
controlled the agency with the power to levy road charges and manage London's roads;
and he had technical studies already in place. His primary challenge was to deliver
congestion charges prior to the 2004 election (Richards 2006). As a result of the short
time frame, Livingstone chose a technical option, camera enforcement, which was easy
to implement but expensive to run. Whereas Singapore's electronic in-vehicle units
required a roll-out to all drivers in the area, London's camera system only required that
cameras be installed to read license plates at the zone boundaries. Drivers register
their license plate for the day prior to driving into the city, and the system uses computer
technology to verify that the plates entering the zone have pre-registered. Livingstone
insisted that charges be checked manually to prevent errant charges from computer
errors (Gomez-Ibanez 2010). Another advantage of video tolling was that cameras are
fairly unobtrusive, and the overhead gantries used in Singapore would have been an
eyesore on London's narrow streets.
The downside of video-tolling and careful error checking was that it greatly
reduced the profitability of the system: in 2004 London spent over one-third of its
revenue running collection operations (Transport for London 2004). Also, London had
made a number of exceptions to the system. Motorcycles could enter for free because
of the difficulty of reading their small license plates. Residents only paid 10 percent of
the charge, and taxicabs were free. All of these concessions enhanced the political
acceptability of Livingstone's scheme but made the London system less effective than
Singapore's.
London's congestion pricing went into effect in February 2003. The price was E5
to enter the city center between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. on weekdays. Despite the
concessions made for political expedience, there was a 33 percent decrease in cars
entering Central London during charging hours, and congestion delays declined by 30
percent almost immediately (Transport for London 2004). Collection costs ended up
exceeding projections, and overall the implementation was smooth. Livingstone
reentered the Labour party and won reelection in 2004 in large part based on his
success with congestion pricing. Congestion pricing continues to be an active area of
policy debate in London, but the initial system is well established.
Congestion Pricing in New York City
London's successful implementation of a cordon toll in the central business
district vaulted congestion pricing to the forefront of transit-policy debates in a number
of major cities. Discussion of congestion pricing in New York began among advocacy
groups outside of the city government. In particular, Partnership for New York City
played a key role in conducting research and publicizing the argument for congestion
pricing (Schaller 2009). This nonprofit advocacy group represents a network of
business leaders with the mission of building the economy of the city and maintaining
the city's global leadership in finance, innovation, and commerce (Partnership for New
York City). The group's internal research suggested that congestion cost the city $13
billion annually through wasted time, increased production costs, and lost business
opportunities (Partnership for New York City 2006).
The debate was quickly joined by other groups primarily focused on the
economic and transportation elements. The Queens Chamber of Commerce argued
that congestion pricing would be disastrous for the city's economy (Queens Chamber of
Commerce 2006). Proponents responded that driving was not a necessity in New York
City, and that congestion pricing would make New York City more attractive for
business and high-skill workers (Schaller 2009). Mayor Bloomberg initially expressed
limited interest in congestion pricing due to the political risks, but he continued to leave
it open as an option to consider (Schaller 2006).
Prospects for the congestion charge began to improve in September 2006, when
Bloomberg announced the creation of the Office of Long-Term Planning and
Sustainability. The announcement focused on climate change stated the mayor's plans
to conduct a greenhouse-gas inventory for the city and create a Sustainability Advisory
Board to advise the city on sustainable policy and practice (City of New York 2006a). In
December, Bloomberg announced ten sustainability goals including building more
affordable housing, improving mass transit, enhancing water security, providing cleaner
power, reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, and cleaning up air, water, and
contaminated land (City of New York 2006b). His overarching goal, he said, was to
improve quality of life and the environment for the next generation of New Yorkers.
On April 22, 2007, Bloomberg used the occasion of Earth Day to unveil PlaNYC,
an ambitious set of initiatives that would realize the sustainability goals announced the
previous December. PlaNYC lays out an optimistic vision for the city, looking to build on
past success and deal with future challenges associated with updating the city and
accommodating a growing population. The plan articulates an aggressive vision,
seeking active planning solutions to improve the physical city, including housing,
outdoor space, water and power infrastructure, and congested road and transit by 2030
(City of New York 2007b).
The document cites three main challenges facing New York City in upcoming
decades: "growth, an aging infrastructure, and an increasingly precarious environment."
Growth will put additional pressure on New York City's already congested in roads and
subways, so the city's aging infrastructure will need to be repaired or updated. New
York City's environment is an ongoing challenge with the city below Clean Air Act
standards from 1970 for ozone and soot and suffers from one of the highest rates of
asthma in the country. The plan specifically focuses on climate change, citing a target
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent by 2030 (City of New York
2007b). The report identifies the need for holistic solutions since the problems the city
faces are complex and interconnected. For instance, it says that the choice to address
congestion problems by building new roads or improving mass transit fundamentally
changes the city, and these choices need to be dealt with through comprehensive
planning. The plan also focuses on securing funding for proposed solutions, rather than
leaving these decisions to future policymakers. By providing funding up front, they hope
to ensure the successful implementation of a broad range of proposals (City of New
York 2007b).
For transit, the plan lists two primary goals: reducing travel times and reaching a
state of good repair for transportation infrastructure. To do this, it recommends several
tactics: expanding the city's mass transportation network, completing a bike master
plan, instituting better road management, and adopting congestion pricing. Congestion
pricing was the centerpiece of the transit proposals; the proposal was to establish a flat
fee for driving into Manhattan below 84th Street on a weekday between 6 a.m. and 6
p.m. (City of New York 2007a). The plan proposed a three-year pilot program, funded
with federal and private dollars, to see if congestion pricing is the right choice for the
city. Enacting this controversial provision would require approval from the state
legislature because several of the primary agencies were outside of the city's control.
Congestion pricing was justified as both a direct way to reduce traffic congestion
and a source of revenue to repair and upgrade transportation infrastructure. PlaNYC
estimated transit funding needs of nearly $30 billion, so the plan proposed the creation
of a new regional entity for transportation finance, the SMART (Sustainable Mobility and
Regional Transportation) Financing Authority. The authority relies on revenue from
congestion pricing and city and state commitments to finance transportation
infrastructure repairs and expansion. The transportation plans affect other areas of
focus within PlaNYC. In particular, reducing automobile usage has a major role in
addressing the air-quality problems of the city and meeting greenhouse-gas reduction
targets. Also, transportation improvements play a large part in expanding the
availability of affordable housing with access to jobs for the city's growing population
(City of New York 2007b).
Meanwhile in December 2006, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DoT),
headed by Bush appointee Secretary Mary Peters, released guidance for their Urban
Partnership Agreements program. The program asked cities to apply for a share of $1
billion to pursue "aggressive congestion-relief programs." Decisions would be
announced in August (U.S. Department of Transportation). Bloomberg announced his
intention to apply for DoT funding for his congestion-pricing proposal and pursued
approval from the state to apply. In June, New York's Governor Spitzer endorsed
Bloomberg's congestion-pricing proposal. As part of his endorsement, however, Spitzer
insisted on a change to Bloomberg's financing proposal. Whereas Bloomberg wanted
to create a new city-run transit agency, Spitzer preferred using the funds for New York's
Metropolitan Transit Authority's (MTA) Capital improvements and budget deficits (Hakim
and Rivera 2007). Spitzer thus insisted on moving the revenue stream from a new city-
controlled agency to an existing agency where the state government wielded a great
deal of influence. With the Democratic Governor's support being essential to pressure a
reluctant Democratic Assembly, Mayor Bloomberg had to adopt the Governor's
suggestion.
New York City announced its intention to apply for funding through DoT's Urban
Partnership Agreements program to receive up to $500 million to support
implementation of the toll. DoT Secretary Mary Peters expressed preliminary approval,
contingent on action from the New York State Assembly by July 16th (Hakim and Rivera
2007). As the topic entered the legislative arena, however, critics voiced several
concerns. For instance, Assemblyman Joseph Lentol (D, Brooklyn) worried that
neighborhoods bordering the congestion zone would become parking lots (Hakim and
Rivera 2007), and Assemblyman Richard Brodsky (D, Westchester) argued that roads
are public spaces that should be freely accessible to everyone (Confessore 2007).
Bloomberg countered by focusing on the numerous costs of congestion, pointing out
that idling cars produce deadly gases that pollute neighboring areas (Confessore 2007).
On June 2 0 th, a few weeks after Spitzer's endorsement, Bloomberg announced
his departure from the Republican Party. The move led to speculation that the mayor
was considering an independent run for the White House (Shear 2007). Bloomberg
related it to his desire to push a progressive reform agenda in New York City, stating his
desire to put partisanship aside and focus on improving the city (Chan 2007). Though
not explicitly related to congestion pricing, the move showed Bloomberg's willingness
maneuver politically to push progressive reform.
The legislative debate on Bloomberg's proposal focused on the plan's impact on
the outer boroughs. More than half of those driving into the central business district on
a workday are from the city, and many of these areas in the city are not well served by
subway (Newman 2007). Bloomberg had cited air-quality benefits to the boroughs as a
result of reduced through traffic, but Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver (D, Manhattan)
questioned these benefits, worrying about drivers parking near the zone and taking
subways from there (Nissan 2007). Assemblyman Ruben Diaz (D, Bronx) summed up
the opponents' concerns by saying that the plan amounted to a tax on his constituents
without clear benefits through either environmental or transit improvements (Hakim
2007a). The assembly dragged its feet debating the measure, forcing Spitzer to
threaten to call the legislature back during summer recess to vote on the proposal
before the Department of Transportation deadline. Hoping to expedite the process, on
July 19, the state passed a bill creating a commission to study options for congestion
relief in Manhattan (Hakim 2007b). The bill also authorized the state to apply for federal
funding. The Department of Transportation was satisfied with Bloomberg's proposal
and awarded New York City $354 million to implement congestion relief. The award
was actually geared primarily to implementing bus improvements, but to get the money
New York's state legislature had to approve a congestion-relief plan by April 8, 2008
(Neuman 2007). New York now had eight months to study the issue and reach a
broader consensus on a plan.
The Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission consisted of 17 members
appointed by state legislators. Its purpose was to "undertake a review and study of
plans to reduce traffic congestion and other related health and safety issues within the
City of New York" (New York State Department of Transportation 2008d). The state
legislature had charged the Commission with creating a plan that would reduce vehicle
miles traveled within downtown Manhattan by at least 6.3 percent, to match
Bloomberg's plan (Neuman 2008a). The TCMC held seven public meetings to study
congestion-mitigation proposals and solicit public input. In addition, they hosted two
rounds of public-engagement meetings. The first of these rounds took place between
October 24 and November 5, 2008, and covered mitigation options. The commission
released an interim report on January 10, 2008 and held a second round of public-
engagement meetings for comments on the report. Marc Shaw, a former deputy mayor
under Bloomberg, chaired the commission. He oversaw presentations from agency
staff to the commission and directed agency staff in preparing the interim and final
reports (Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission 2008).
Shaw made his position clear in the first Commission meeting, explaining that the
only way for the city to grow economically was to improve mass transit, and the
revenues from congestion pricing would be a key component of that agenda. The city
then presented its plan to the commission and took questions. Several members asked
questions on topics directly related to their own districts, such as about the impact on
traffic in a particular location or the placement of bus routes. Richard Brodsky pressed
the city on broader issues relating to the Commission's legal mandate and whether
there was sufficient information to justify the city's claims. Brodsky also wanted
clarification on whether revenues would be used for MTA capital expansion or operating
expenses (Naparstek 2007).
The first round of public meetings revealed strong support for the congestion
charge in Manhattan but serious concerns elsewhere. Participants at public meetings in
White Plains and Hofstra University raised concerns over the proposal's impact on
outlying areas and asked how people in areas with poor transit access would travel into
the city (Aaron 2007a). In Manhattan, by contrast, the tone was very supportive of
Bloomberg's proposal. Speakers focused on details such as residential parking permits
and concerns over subway construction plans (Aaron 2007b). The public meetings
highlighted concern over modeling the proposals implications for New York. Following
on concerns raised by Brodsky in the first congestion committee meeting, people
questioned how well the city understood the potential impact on traffic in and around the
charging zone, the environment, and public health. After one meeting, Bloomberg
questioned the validity of Brodsky's concerns in a radio interview, saying "Richard
Brodsky lives in the suburbs, represents the suburbs, and has lots to say about the
city... The truth of the matter is, you can always say, 'Oh, I don't believe your estimate.'
You can't run a railroad that way" (Anon. 2007).
On January 31, 2008, the Commission approved a revised congestion-mitigation
plan by a 13-2 vote (Neuman 2008b). The revised plan left the major elements of the
mayor's plan in place but changed some aspects. The size of the congestion zone was
reduced, now tolling only vehicles that drove below 6 0 th Street as opposed to 84 th
Street. Vehicles driving solely within the congestion zone were no longer charged by
the new plan, primarily to reduce implementation costs. The plan also eliminated the
residential parking-tax exemption and added a taxi surcharge within the zone. The
estimated $491 million in revenue annually would be devoted to mass transit expansion
and improvements (Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission 2008). The dissenting
votes were from Assemblymen Brodsky and Herman Farrell (D, Upper Manhattan).
Both were appointed to the committee by Assembly Speaker Silver, a skeptic of the toll
concept (Neuman 2008b).
The revised plan now required legislative approval prior to the April 7 th deadline
imposed by the federal Department of Transportation. To potentially demonstrate its
support, the New York City Council also took up the measure, even though it had no
authority to enact it. The city council was to consider a "home rule measure," which
essentially requests that the state legislature approve the bill in order to show the
council's support for the measure (Cardwell 2008). Even though the council had no
direct authority, a no-vote would have sent a strong signal to the legislature that the
proposal was not popular in the city. At this point, congestion pricing had the support of
Mayor Bloomberg, Governor Spitzer, and the majority leader of the state senate,
Joseph Bruno, a Republican. But the Democratic state assembly promised to be the
major hurdle to passing the bill because Speaker Silver had expressed critical views on
the proposal. Bloomberg and Silver had clashed in the past when Silver blocked
Bloomberg's proposal to build a stadium on the West Side of Manhattan as part of the
city's Olympic bid, so obtaining the speaker's support promised to be difficult (Paybarah
2008).
On March 10, news broke that Governor Spitzer had been caught arranging for a
prostitute on a wiretap by federal investigators (Hakim and Rashbaum 2008). The
governor resigned two days later citing personal reasons (Grynbaum 2008). The
scandal cost Mayor Bloomberg a major supporter of congestion pricing. The new
Governor, David Patterson endorsed the proposal on March 22, but in the transition
supporters of congestion pricing lost valuable time and political capital. Silver had not
outright opposed the proposal though, perhaps because he wanted to get a better feel
for how public opinion would play out. After all, he represented a Manhattan district and
his direct constituents tended to favor the plan. Instead he delayed the committee vote
by saying that finalizing the state's budget, due March 31, would have to be the top
legislative priority. Silver continued to press for more information, demanding a clear
idea from the city regarding mass-transit improvements and other implications
(Paybarah 2008).
A Quinnipiac Poll released March 24 showed New York City voters supported the
proposal by a 67 percent to 27 percent margin, and voters statewide supported it by a
60 percent to 30 percent margin. Support was considerably stronger among Democrats
than Republicans (67 percent compared to 53 percent). If the money was designated
for general city purposes instead of transit, however, only 33 percent of voters statewide
supported the proposal (Quinnipiac University 2008).
On March 31, the city council voted in favor of the proposal by a margin of 30-20.
The vote was unusually close for a city council that passes most measures in near
unanimity (Cardwell 2008). The vote was characterized by much last-minute wrangling
and coaxing by the mayor, who had lobbied council members to change their position
(Gonzalez 2008) after earlier polls had predicted a 2-1 result against the measure
(Rivera 2008). The measure received unanimous support in Manhattan and the Bronx
(one Bronx Council member was not present), but the majority in Queens, Brooklyn,
and Staten Island were opposed (Fried 2008). The mayor had shown his willingness
use political leverage and bargain in order to get his proposal enacted, but the close
vote damaged the proposal's momentum in the state legislature.
On April 7th, the federal deadline for approval of the congestion plan, the state
assembly's Democratic caucus announced after a closed-door meeting that it would not
bring the measure up for a vote (Confessore 2008b). The state senate had pushed for
a floor vote, and Senate Majority Leader Bruno had promised that there were sufficient
votes to pass the proposal. Assembly Speaker Silver refused to call for a floor vote,
saying his caucus was very much opposed to the proposal, perhaps by a four to one
margin (Confessore 2008b). We cannot tell who would have voted for the plan, and
even Silver said he may have voted to approve it. Some quick math suggests that this
decision was in the hands of representatives from New York City. The Assembly
Minority Leader, James Tedisco, had promised all 42 Republican assemblyman would
vote for the bill (Confessore 2008a). The Assembly had 107 Democrats, 64 of whom
were from New York City. If Silver's four-to-one margin is accurate, a large majority of
New York City representatives opposed the proposal. Even a simple majority of the
Assemblymen from New York would have secured 75 votes from a floor vote in the
Assembly. Mayor Bloomberg reacted strongly against the lack of a vote, commenting
that "it takes a special type of cowardice for elected officials to refuse to stand up and
vote their conscience" (Confessore 2008a).
The Department of Transportation deadline marked the end of serious
consideration of congestion pricing in New York City. The federal funds were eventually
reassigned to other cities. And even though congestion pricing has periodically been
mentioned by Bloomberg and other political figures, it is not an active issue.
Flawed Policy Design: How Mayor Bloomberg's Proposal Created Opponents to
Congestion Pricing
Mayor Bloomberg justified his transit proposals using values with broad appeal.
There is little disagreement over the need to improve mobility, improve environmental
conditions, and plan for a better future for New York City. A broad constituency
supports these goals, and there was little controversy in the initial planning process that
laid them out. Once the mayor announced PlaNYC, however, it advocated explicit
steps that privileged the interests of some groups over others, and much of the debate
that followed focused on the particulars of the proposal. Specifically, advocates
primarily fought over three aspects of policy design: the impact of the toll on road users,
primarily drivers; revenue generation; and the external benefits associated with reduced
driving and congestion. Most of the opponents were motivated by the first aspect, the
direct impact of the toll. The supporters were drawn to the proposal by the second and
third aspects. Revenues could have provided a bargaining chip to win over more of the
opponents, but the plan failed to do this in a convincing manner.
Impact on Road Users
The most direct impact of Mayor Bloomberg's proposal was on road users. They
are the most direct beneficiaries of the time savings resulting from reduced congestion,
and they are the direct payers of the congestion fee. The congestion toll represents a
large and obvious change to the pricing structure of a resource that was previously free
(Manville and King 2010). In response to the new policy, drivers must either make a
large behavioral change or pay a substantial toll. A commuter paying the toll on
weekdays would spend approximately $2,000 a year as a result of the proposal and
receive relatively little direct benefit from the use of funds. Income redistribution was a
major focus of arguments on both sides, with opponents viewing the toll as a flat charge
that unfairly targeted poorer drivers. Assemblyman Brodsky argued that pricing access
to public spaces is unfair (Confessore 2007) and that the toll amounted to a tax on
middle class people (Dobnik 2007). In hopes of marginalizing this argument, Mayor
Bloomberg emphasized that less than 5 percent of workers commute into the central
city via automobile (City of New York 2007a; City of New York 2007b). Since these
drivers tend to be wealthier, a congestion toll would be progressive with respect to the
overall population. Especially in New York City where driving is very expensive, this
issue mostly affects income distribution between the upper and middle classes, but the
policy is regressive among drivers in these groups.
To respond to the mayor's argument, opponents argued that the mayor unfairly
focused only on commuters, and they tried to make drivers appear more sympathetic.
Opponents emphasized that many drivers were poor and came from areas with little
transit access, or were elderly and could not use transit as easily. Advocates from
Queens emphasized that poor transit access in the borough required residents to drive,
so this toll would unfairly burden those with little choice but to drive (New York State
Department of Transportation 2008a). Opponents from Staten Island pointed out that
the borough was already the most heavily tolled county in the country, and the new toll
raised serious questions about regional equity (New York State Department of
Transportation 2008b).
These arguments about the impact on specific boroughs reflect the fact that
although congestion pricing lacks a clear relationship with respect to income, it can
cause large transfers based on location. These transfers can be particularly troubling
politically because they may align with voting districts. The city council vote had shown
that Manhattan and the Bronx were strongly in favor of the proposal but Brooklyn,
Queens, and Staten Island were opposed. Manhattan was a clear beneficiary of the
plan. The congestion reductions would primarily be on Manhattan streets, so residents
would directly benefit from less noise and air pollution and better mobility. Prior to
spending toll revenues, transit speeds would improve inside the charging zone while
impacts outside the zone were ambiguous. Manhattan residents would also be the
primary beneficiaries of improved travel times for trucking, cabs, and emergency
vehicles. To top it off, the Commission proposal was not going to charge Manhattan
residents for trips they took entirely inside the zone. The primary justification for this
was cost, as monitoring internally rather than along the cordon would add substantially
to the cost (Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission 2008).
Instead of charging for intra-zone trips, the city would remove a parking taxes
exemption enjoyed by Manhattan residents. Still, the overall impact of this change was
up for debate, and respondents complained about differential treatment between
Manhattan and the outer boroughs. Even if the elimination of the tax exemption ended
up costing Manhattan residents as much as those entering the zone, opponents argued
that it was special treatment (New York State Department of Transportation 2008a).
The overall plan created an impression, as Assemblyman Ruben Diaz (D, Bronx)
voiced, of taxing the boroughs to improve quality of life inside Manhattan (Hakim
2007a). Not surprisingly, then, the primary opposition from the plan came from
boroughs outside of Manhattan, particularly Eastern Queens and Southern Brooklyn
that were more auto-dependent and had worse transit access (Schaller 2009).
Tolling within the city had historically been a contentious issue. Several
proposals to institute tolls on the East River bridges have been defeated including a
proposal in 2008 that followed on the defeat of the cordon toll. Proposals to toll people
driving from one part of the city to another, in this case from Brooklyn or Queens to
Manhattan have engendered strong opposition from the outer boroughs. Congestion
pricing amounted to just such a toll, so it generated the same negative reaction from
Brooklyn and Queens. To make matters worse, the proposal allowed drivers paying an
existing toll while entering the city to net it against the congestion charge. Drivers
coming from New Jersey already pay $8 for crossing the Hudson at the Holland tunnel,
Lincoln tunnel, or George Washington Bridge, so the congestion charge would not add
any costs for these drivers. Drivers coming from Connecticut or outside the city from
the East typically pay $5.50 to cross one of the major crossings such as the Bronx-
Whitestone or Triboro bridges, so their net charge would only be $2.50 (Metropolitan
Transportation Authority 2009).
The specific congestion-pricing plan proposed in New York City was problematic
because of these geographic transfers. The plan was open to being portrayed as a tax
on a few boroughs in order to improve conditions in Manhattan. While congestion
pricing in abstract is not uniformly regressive, the specifics of this plan favored wealthy
Manhattan over the poorer out Boroughs. In doing so, it mobilized opponents and
enabled them to craft a compelling political story. In recognition of this problem, authors
of the plan sought to mitigate the unfairness in tolling with the use of funds.
Revenue Generation
Since drivers are unlikely to be net beneficiaries of congestion pricing, the social
benefits depend on the other justifications for the proposal: revenue and non-
congestion-related externalities. The city was upfront about the need to use congestion
pricing to generate revenue for transit, but changes made to the original proposal
removed the funds from city control and redirected them to the state controlled MTA and
Port Authority. These changes ultimately made it more difficult to build support for the
proposal.
PlaNYC explicitly states that the city needs $30 billion for transit infrastructure
repairs and upgrades and relied on congestion pricing to play a large role in meeting
this funding need. Marc Shaw, chairman of the Traffic Congestion Mitigation
Commission, argued that transit was the only way to get more people into the city for
economic growth, and to do that, it needed funding (Naparstek 2007). Bloomberg
repeatedly stressed the need for Congestion Pricing based on transit funding. PlaNYC
focused on a huge funding gap that congestion pricing would help fill. Polling data
showed that tying the revenue to transit was a prerequisite to popular support
(Quinnipiac University 2008). Many advocates supporting the proposal stressed the
need to raise revenues for transit. Several groups cited revenue generation as a
primary reason to support the Commission's revised plan over rationing (New York
State Department of Transportation 2008a; New York State Department of
Transportation 2008b; New York State Department of Transportation 2008c). Yet on
the other side, critics complained that the city was focused on money rather than the
other benefits of the proposal (Naparstek 2008).
Mayor Bloomberg's initial proposal was to create a new regional financing
authority to dispense congestion-pricing revenue as well as city and state
appropriations. Early in the process, Governor Spitzer modified the proposal to direct
money to existing agencies and plug holes in the MTA's budget (Hakim and Rivera
2007). The mayor's proposal sought to maintain city control of the revenue, but the
existing transit agencies including the Port Authority and MTA were largely state
controlled. MTA board members are appointed by the governor, though some are
recommended by the mayor (MTA 2010). The existing chairman and vice chairman are
both recommended and appointed by the governor. The Port Authority by-laws specify
that the governor of each member state (New York and New Jersey) has a veto over
actions taken by the Authority's governance committee (Board of Commissions of the
Port Authority 2008). The state control of revenues from the plan meant Bloomberg
could not ensure revenues would be used for transit improvements.
PlaNYC aimed to use the congestion-pricing revenues for transit improvements
in the city. Transit improvements ideally can address two types of imbalances from
congestion pricing: first, they can undo the regressively of the congestion charge, as
poorer travelers benefit from better service; second, transit improvements can
theoretically address geographic imbalances of the congestion charge since the
revenues can be devoted to capital improvements in specific areas. Using toll revenue
for specific transportation improvements was more popular than using the funds for
general government purposes. Polling data in New York City showed strong support for
the proposal if revenues were used for transit, although the majority of respondents
were opposed to congestion pricing if the use of revenues was unspecified (Quinnipiac
University 2008). Public support was justified though, as New York City planned for
several transportation upgrades as part of the congestion pricing rollout. The award
from the Department of Transportation included $213.6 million to improve and build new
bus depots around the city, $112.7 million to develop bus rapid transit service from
Brooklyn and Queens into Manhattan, and $15.8 million to expand ferry service
(Neuman 2007).
To the extent that support for congestion pricing in the outer boroughs depended
on enthusiasm for the use of revenues, the perceived efficiency and reliability of the
spending plan would become a key determinant of support for the proposal. Recipients
will not value the benefits if they do not trust that the revenues will be distributed
effectively and in accordance with the plan. At public meetings, supporters touted the
transit improvements, while opponents questioned whether the city would deliver
promised improvements (New York State Department of Transportation 2008a). These
tensions result from the inevitable situation where residents have to agree to the
charges upfront, and receive benefits down the line.
New York City struggled with a credible commitment problem, where officials
tried to commit to spending the revenues and delivering on the promised services, but
voters did not fully trust that the officials would live up to those promises (Manville and
King 2010). Professors Manville and King write, "Congestion pricing in New York was
torpedoed by intergovernmental conflict, and by doubts that the toll revenue would really
be spent on new transit projects, as promised" (6). The credibility of the organizations
and officials was central to the discussion, and the MTA's poor track record delivering
promised upgrades may have undermined the proposal. In March of 2008, only a
month before the deadline for approval, the MTA released a revised capital plan that
included $4.5 billion of secured financing based on congestion-pricing revenues
(Metropolitan Transit Authority 2008). Whether or not it was fair, the MTA had suffered
consistent criticism for financial mismanagement that contributed to the need for recent
fare increases. With an anticipated funding hole already looming in the MTA's budget,
politicians and voters would have good reason to doubt whether the organization could
deliver on promised improvements. Borough meetings highlighted the need to commit
to revenue plans, with even supporters of congestion pricing requesting that funds be
placed into a transit-improvement lockbox (New York State Department of
Transportation 2008a). Ironically, critics' concerns would have been addressed by
Mayor Bloomberg's original proposal to house the congestion pricing revenues in a
separate agency responsible for transportation planning and development.
External effects of Congestion Pricing
Many of the supporters of congestion pricing are attracted to the policy due to its
potential to reduce externalities relating to environmental and land-use impacts that
affect quality of life in the city and around the world. While these factors tend to be less
significant in cost-benefit calculations and theoretical research (Komanoff 2010; Gomez-
Ibanez 1992), they comprise an important part of the public argument for congestion
pricing and attract influential supporters. For instance, environmental groups concerned
with pollution from driving and health advocates concerned with local health impacts
both supported congestion pricing. In an effort to generate even broader public support,
Mayor Bloomberg explicitly linked the congestion-pricing proposal to goals such as
environmental stewardships, urban vitality, and quality of life (City of New York 2007a).
He introduced the plan at a time of growth and prosperity for the city, but argued that
growth necessitated planning for the future. He pointed out that mobility and housing
problems would only get worse as the population continued to grow. These goals
motivated a broad group of interests such as environmentalists and public health
advocates behind the idea of sustainable transportation for the city's future (Schaller
2009).
An example of a justification based on indirect impacts of the plan is asthma
reduction in areas surrounding the central city. Mayor Bloomberg argued that the plan
would reduce congestion in arterials feeding the central business district and reduce the
number of "toll shoppers" taking city streets through poor areas to avoid tolls on the
major crossings. In public meetings, some supporters focused on this same benefit,
citing the high rates of asthma and lung cancer in Staten Island, the benefits of reduced
congestion to air quality (New York State Department of Transportation 2008b).
Unfortunately for supporters, the data on the environmental impact on
surrounding areas was ambiguous, and the arguments were turned against them.
Reducing the number of cars traveling to the central city reduces the amount of pass-
through traffic. But detractors pointed out that cars previously making in-and-out trips
through the city might instead use routes surrounding the cordon. Assemblyman Silver
argued that drivers would be tempted to leave their cars in nearby neighborhoods and
take transit into the central business district, turning these neighborhoods into parking
lots (Hakim 2007a). He argued that environmental conditions could worsen outside of
the zone.' Both sides argued local environmental conditions were a reason to support
their position.
There was little dispute that congestion pricing would reduce greenhouse-gas
emissions and give New York City greater planning control over its future, but for many
There is some support for this contention. A study looking at the impact of the congestion-charging
scheme on ambient air quality in London found that air quality measures improved significantly inside the
zone, but declined significantly along the perimeter (Ho and Maddison 2008).
opponents, these were not the primary considerations. They were being asked to weigh
concentrated and immediate costs such as large toll payments or a switch to mass
transit against long-term social goals (Schaller 2009). In many cases, those benefits
were not as clear-cut as the costs: a toll payment appears very tangible compared to
an estimated drop in air pollution coming from a city-run transit model.
Overall, the congestion pricing plan created winners and losers, as do many
proposed policies. The losers were easy to identify as drivers paying the toll. These
drivers were concentrated in specific geographic areas, which gave them direct
representatives in the city council and state assembly; moreover, the other residents of
these areas were not primary beneficiaries of the plan. The winners were
geographically concentrated in Manhattan, which fueled longstanding rivalries between
the outer boroughs and Manhattan and contributed to the perception that the policy was
regressive. Revenues could have been used to undo some of these concerns, but the
spending plans failed to win support from the outer boroughs because the revenues
were going to be directed to an unreliable authority.
This leaves two broad questions unanswered. First how did the plan develop in
such a way and why were its proponents unable to adjust it once its defects were
apparent? Second, all congestion-pricing proposals are bound to be unpopular with
some groups, yet they sometimes get enacted. How were opponents able to derail this
particular proposal?
The Process: How Potential Losers Became Political Opponents
The process leading up to congestion pricing developed as two separate threads
that came together in PlaNYC. First, civic and advocacy groups, in particular
Partnership for New York, worked to establish the costs of congestion to New York City
and push congestion pricing as the logical solution. Second, Mayor Bloomberg's long-
term land-use planning effort for New York City in 2006 that developed into PlaNYC
(Schaller 2009). Bloomberg had expressed little interest in congestion pricing before
early 2006 (Schaller 2006), but PlaNYC needed congestion pricing to fund a major
portion of the planned transportation improvements for the city.
In July 2007, the state assembly opted to establish the Traffic Congestion
Mitigation Commission rather than directly approving the mayor's proposal. The TCMC
was responsible for conducting a series of meetings and a public engagement process
with the broad mandate of reducing congestion in the central business district. It
presented an opportunity to create a congestion-reduction plan that was more
responsive to public comment and inclusive of opposition interests. Unfortunately,
because of the deadline for federal funds, the time frame was very tight, with a final
report due six months after the legislative order to create the commission.
Opponents accused the Congestion Mitigation Commission of making little effort
to consider meaningful changes to the plan. The Commission chairman, Marc Shaw
was a Bloomberg insider, and according to the minority report, "until the final
commission meeting, all commission meetings were for the sole purpose of receiving
city staff reports. No deliberative sessions were held." (New York State Department of
Transportation 2008e). The minority report goes on to make a number of criticisms of
the process (New York State Department of Transportation 2008e):
- The research was driven by the city, which controlled the models and only
presented results at the meetings without effectively responding to requests
for information.
- The city used different models to answer different questions, which seemed
like data manipulation.
- The models obscured the truth about the toll's regressivity by focusing on
commuters, who are a small portion of the total drivers.
- The commission diverged from its mandate by being overly focused on
revenue generation rather than congestion reduction.
- The evidence on the environmental benefit was not fully developed.
- The commission did not address parking permits or impact on neighborhoods
near the zone.
- The mass transit improvements should happen prior to the charges being in
place, and the current commitments are insufficient; there was no assurance
that the funds will actually be spent on transit improvements.
- Once in place, the congestion free will be insufficient to reduce congestion
enough and will likely be increased.
- Privacy concerns are not addressed in any meaningful way.
At public meetings, opponents criticized the Commission for poor communication
and disingenuous attempts to be inclusive. Meetings were poorly advertised and
relevant community leaders were not invited to participate or speak (New York State
Department of Transportation 2008b). Many of the meetings in the October round were
held in the evening on Halloween, which is not a good time for many residents (New
York State Department of Transportation 2008e). Underlying these complaints were
consistent concerns over trust: the opponents saw the city as being supportive of
wealthy and business interests, biased towards Manhattan, primarily concerned with
revenue, and willing to shape the model results to support their initial conclusions.
The Commission presented an opportunity to step back from the plan and
redevelop aspects of it that were contentious while building trust between the city and
the primary opponents. The time frame was a major challenge, but plan proponents
chose to approach the meetings with a solution already in place, merely presenting their
argument and then allowing the commission to change some minor details. Even if
congestion pricing was the best solution, going into the meetings tied to this approach to
solving congestion turned off opponents who felt that their concerns were not properly
addressed. Testimony from opponents suggests that they felt their specific concerns
were being ignored by the city (New York State Department of Transportation 2008b).
Making matters worse, supporters of congestion pricing, from Mayor Bloomberg
to blog commentators consistently portray the opponents in a very negative light. Mayor
Bloomberg accused opponents of lacking leadership and courage (Confessore 2008a).
Streetsblog, a sustainability and transit focused blog site, consistently treated
Assemblyman Brodsky as being obstinate and selfishly supportive of narrow driving
interests (Naparstek 2008; Varone 2007). In fact, however, the minority report made
well-reasoned arguments against the plan that was being put forth for New York City.
Proponents were overly confident in the strength of their solution to productively engage
with opponents, and it eventually cost them approval.
Political and Institutional Context
While it's true that congestion pricing in New York City had opponents, it also had
strong public support and the backing of both the mayor and the governor. In London,
two boroughs had been strongly opposed to the plan, yet it proceeded without
substantial difficulty. The complex political structure in which transit policy for New York
City must be approved created many opportunities for opponents to derail the proposal
and increased the difficulty of finding a workable compromise. At a basic level, the
political context is not an explanation for failure in itself. Every locale has its unique
institutional structure that is immutable in the context of a specific policy proposal. That
said, the political context helps determine which debates or tensions are politically
significant in determining the proposal's outcome.
In New York, congestion pricing had to win the approval of a wide range of
political entities with different agendas: three legislative bodies, four executives, and the
U.S. Department of Transportation. Mayor Bloomberg initiated the proposal, and did so
as a progressive leader from the Republican Party, but he left the party soon after
proposing the plan. New York Governors Spitzer and Paterson, both Democrats, had
veto power over the proposal and had to help force it through the state assembly.
Governor Corzine of New Jersey had veto power over key aspects of the plan through
the New York-New Jersey Port Authority, which would have to fund $1 billion of transit
improvements as part of the plan. The governors of both New York and New Jersey
have veto power over port authority actions. The New York City Council vote influenced
perception of the proposal prior to state legislative votes. Both houses of New York
State's legislature, the senate and the assembly, had to approve the final measure. The
state senate was Republican controlled and primarily represented upstate New York,
and the Assembly was Democratic controlled and heavily represented New York City.
Lastly, the plan had to win the approval of the Department of Transportation and
President Bush's appointed Secretary of Transportation, Mary Peters. All of these
institutions created a complex political structure made it difficult to pass any reform
proposal.
The numerous political entities with a say in the outcome made different types of
changes that antagonized key constituencies of other entities. For instance, the final
proposal to emerge from the Congestion Mitigation Commission netted tolls for drivers
from New Jersey, so they would have paid the same amount before and after the
charge. The New York City Council, feeling pressure from the outer boroughs, added a
separate surcharge on New Jersey as part of its vote to approve congestion pricing in
early April (Belson and Chen 2008). Governor Corzine reacted strongly against the
council's proposal and threatened to pursue legal action to block the amendment.
Bloomberg's plan had been generous to New Jersey in order to enable the Port
Authority's contribution to the proposal, but this caused Brooklyn and Queens to see it
as unfair. The city council vote, which often votes in unanimity, was characterized by
pressure and concessions from the mayor's office to secure the necessary votes. For
instance Sunset Park and Gravesend Brooklyn were offered Ferry lines, earning
Bloomberg charges of political strong-arming and bribery (Gonzalez 2008). Here, the
number of bodies that needed to be appeased was quite large, which made
compromise very difficult.
The personalities involved may have played a role as well. Governor Spitzer's
scandal and resignation a few weeks before the vote cost the proposal its main
Democratic champion and a figure with the political clout to line up support in the
majority party. The scandal had nothing to do with congestion pricing and was just bad
luck for proponents of the proposal. Mayor Bloomberg's background as a business
leader and former Republican added to the perception that he favored business
interests and wealthy Manhattan residents and workers over the poorer boroughs.
Contrast this with Mayor Livingston in London, whose left-wing political credentials gave
him the credibility to deal with potential opponents from the left. Mayor Bloomberg and
Assemblyman Silver also had personal history, having clashed over the mayor's plans
to build a stadium on the west side of Manhattan.
Congestion pricing did not have to clear three legislative houses in Singapore,
London, or Stockholm as it did in New York. The institutional complexity of reform in
New York made a more inclusive process and policy design that appeased more
opponents was even more essential. The changes that might have come out of that
process may have made the policy weaker from a theoretical perspective, but they
could have allowed proponents to achieve their basic goals.
New York Versus London
London's cordon toll is the best political analogue to the proposal in New York
City. Mayor Livingstone had to navigate a complex political landscape and balance
competing interest groups in order to secure his system. The challenges Livingstone
faced and the compromises he had to make foreshadowed the difficulties faced by
Mayor Bloomberg. Livingstone's ability to navigate London's political terrain and secure
implementation of a congestion charge provide a counterpoint to Mayor Bloomberg's
failure to get his proposal approved.
In comparison to New York, London had studied congestion pricing openly prior
to the 2000 mayoral election. It became a major issue in the campaign, with Ken
Livingstone promising to implement it if elected, so his victory established implicit voter
approval for congestion pricing. Transport for London (TfL) spent money upfront
improving roads surrounding the zone and bus service as the mayor began to
implement the congestion pricing plan. Like New York, London did not have an
inclusive planning process, but Livingstone had a greater popular mandate to pursue
the plan.
Mayor Livingstone went to great lengths to ensure that collection was as painless
as possible, even at the expense of high operating costs (Gomez-Ibanez 2005). This
choice reflects the fact that the economic analysis may not be a driving force behind the
political success of failure congestion pricing. London suffered cost overruns and spent
over one-third of its revenues on collection, netting only E130 million in the first year
(Transport for London 2004), yet its congestion pricing was largely considered a
success. New York City's estimate for net revenue was $491 based on the final plan
released by the Congestion Mitigation Commission, with collection costs of only around
$100 million (New York State Department of Transportation 2008d). These numbers
look very optimistic compared to London, but New York City was able to count on
automated transponders for a large percentage of the charging by piggybacking off the
exiting EZ-Pass system. London used video cameras to capture license plate images
and computers to read and compare the numbers against a database of drivers who
had pre-purchased entry. This video system requires a good deal of human input to
check for accuracy. New York planned to use cameras only as a backup for cars
without EZ-Passes. New York's focus on revenues may have been consistent with the
economic analysis, but it was a political weakness.
Similar to New York City, London had sought to use revenues to support transit
improvements since transit supports the underlying aims of congestion pricing. People
still need to travel into the city, so planners seek to supplant car travel with improved
transit access. In London where the subways were congested, the primary
improvements were made to bus service. TfL also spent E100 million prior to rollout
upgrading roads along the circumference in an attempt to reduce the impact of diverted
traffic on areas bordering the zone (Transport for London 2004). London was able to
implement the improvements up front though due to the mayor's greater control over
transit policy in London, but Bloomberg was unable to spend money in advance of the
implementation. This contrast highlights a key difference between London and New
York City. In London, the mayor was able to use the revenue stream to make the
project more appealing to opponents, while Bloomberg was never able to capitalize on
the revenues to the same extent.
Mayor Livingstone deserves credit for skillfully navigating the politics around
congestion pricing, but he was in a more favorable institutional and political context. He
was able to present his election victory as a referendum on congestion pricing and claim
popular support. Also, he did not have to seek approval from any legislative bodies to
implement the program. Clearly Livingstone had to make compromises, but his path
was much easier than Bloomberg's.
Conclusions
Congestion pricing has strong theoretical appeal as a tool to meet a broad
spectrum of public policy goals. It addresses economic efficiency by seeking to reduce
externalities imposed by drivers on other drivers and thereby allocate road space more
efficiently. It gives engineers a tool to moderate road usage to increase system
performance. It allows policymakers to charge drivers for external costs of driving
including local and global environmental degradation. It gives planners a lever to break
the cycle of congested roads and new construction, allowing them to design more
sustainable cities. Simply put, nobody wins from congested roads, and there is a lot to
be gained from implementing long-term solutions to address the problem. As
economists point out, congestion is a result of overconsumption of an underpriced
resource, and the simplest solution is to adjust prices. Politically, however, raising the
price of driving is challenging.
A careful analysis of New York City's efforts to adopt such a solution reveals
several ways that planners could have improved their prospect of success. As
congestion pricing went from a general idea to a specific plan, opposition inevitably
arose. But proponents could have designed the policy to minimize the number and
political impact of its opponents. The planning process itself is also important and an
improved process could have built a stronger coalition supporting the mayor's basic
proposal. Bloomberg succeeded in building popular support, but in doing so failed to
engage productively with the opponents of the toll. Mayor Livingstone in London was
more inclined and better positioned to build a winning coalition. Latent popular support
was insufficient to secure the plan's eventual adoption. In the longer run, reformers in
New York should target the complex institutional structure that enables opponents to
thwart even popular initiatives. London benefited from a structure that was explicitly
designed to allow for policy innovation, whereas in New York City it is notoriously
difficult to enact policy reform.
The fate of Bloomberg's proposal in New York highlights a number of broad
lessons about policymaking to improve sustainability. First, for any plan that tries to
increase efficiency, the size of the transfers may overwhelm the size of the efficiency
gains. Congestion pricing charges a concentrated group of people a lot of money, and
many of them are losers from the plan. Any attempt to implement it will have to deal
seriously with this issue, and compensating losers so that everyone supports the plan
can be very difficult. Second, the costs are much more concrete than the benefits. A
toll is a direct charge that many people know they will have to pay personally. The
benefits depend on models or theoretical arguments and have a smaller impact on a
larger number of people. Perceptions of these benefits depend greatly on one's own
attitude towards the environment, personal freedom, and income distribution. Any
agreement to compensate the losers will have to overcome the fact that they value the
costs much more highly than the benefits, and this difference in valuation may make an
agreement elusive. Third, the use of revenues from a pricing scheme is very important
because the payers are likely to be net losers. Without the revenues, the social gains
may be uncertain, so the revenues must serve the dual purpose of compensating the
losers and creating a net benefit from the proposal. Fourth, adopting a policymaking
process that inspires trust and constructively works around significant obstacles is
extremely important. People must trust the planners, both that their estimates and
judgment about social benefits is sound, and also that revenues will be spent effectively
to deliver the promised results. Last, the specific political structure can play a large role,
shaping policy choices and potentially making agreements more challenging.
Since 2008, New York's MTA faces growing budget problems, and Bloomberg
has hinted at revisiting congestion pricing as a way to address the issue. The funding
crisis puts the policy in a very different light and could affect the fate of a new proposal.
It could be an advantage if congestion pricing became the least painful way for the city
to raise money; or, it could be a disadvantage since there may not be excess revenues
to compensate potential opponents. Even in the new context, congestion pricing would
still offer many of the features that attracted proponents to the original plan. The
lessons from 2007-2008 could help them build a stronger coalition the second time and
successfully navigate the institutional challenges in New York.
London's success with congestion pricing was a remarkable achievement and
put tolling into the mainstream of policy discussions around traffic and congestion
management. Cities around the world are grappling with congestion problems and will
increasingly consider implementing a pricing system. The idea has a strong theoretical
backing, but perhaps because of this, proponents often start with the presumption that
opponents are ignorant or selfish. Instead, proponents need to realize that the policy
involves real tradeoffs for a lot of people. Proponents' ability to use both policy design
and process to build a winning coalition can go a long way towards improving quality of
life in our cities in upcoming decades.
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